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4
Public and Private Provision
of Pensions and the Ideal
Pension System for Ireland
Gerard Hughes
Jim Stewart
School of Business, Trinity College Dublin
Pension systems in many countries are far from ideal in terms of 
equity, effi ciency, and viability. Pension reform has moved to center 
stage in most developed economies, but it is important to recognize that 
pension reform may not always result in improvement in pension pay-
ments or security.1 Many would dispute the statement in the EU Green 
Paper on pensions that, “Reforms have underpinned recent increases 
in effective retirement ages and opened new avenues to delivering ad-
equate incomes in a sustainable manner” (European Commission 2010, 
p. 5). As shown later, retired persons in Ireland are very dependent on 
state social security payments. Yet the EU Green Paper assumes “pub-
lic replacement rates will decline” and that “it is important to provide 
suffi cient opportunities for complementary entitlements” (European 
Commission 2010, p. 8).
Pension systems need reform, but change is costly for all stakehold-
ers, and hence pension systems have considerable path dependency. 
Reform that leads to the introduction of new sources of pension in-
come leads to the issue of how the new pension arrangements will be 
integrated with existing pension arrangements. If there is replacement, 
there may be considerable administrative costs. A new type of pension 
arrangement, such as an individual pension, is often introduced in addi-
tion to existing arrangements. This has happened in many EU countries 
(see Stewart and Hughes 2009) and leads to considerable ineffi cien-
cies resulting from multiple sources of income, often of relatively small 
amounts. 
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Pension systems and government proposals for pension reform are 
driven by tax relief that disproportionately benefi ts those with higher 
incomes. But the main failure is the low level of income given to those 
in retirement. Although the Irish pension system needs reform, after 
several reviews and a government Green Paper, proposals for reform 
remain inadequate in a number of respects.
IDENTIFYING PENSION REFORM ISSUES 
Reform must be evidence based, yet there are large data gaps in re-
lation to pension systems and the income and assets of retired persons. 
This is especially true of the Irish pension system. Three particular data 
gaps stand out:
1) Despite the enormous cost of tax relief, it is not known whether 
the relief increases net resources for retirement. 
2) Few data are available on the incomes and assets of retired 
persons. We may surmise that the collapse of bank shares (the 
“blue chips”) has disproportionately affected a certain section 
of retired persons, but the extent to which this has happened is 
not known. 
3) Despite the encouragement and tax incentives to join funded 
pension systems, there are no data on the costs in terms of ad-
ministrative and other charges of running such plans. Instead 
a government Green Paper on pension reform (Department of 
Social and Family Affairs 2007a) relied on data from the UK 
pension system—a very different pension system because of 
its considerable economies of scale resulting from its larger 
size. One may surmise that administrative costs are higher in 
Ireland. The Green Paper refers to a “typical charge” of 1.5 
percent per year, but no evidence is offered to support this rate. 
Indeed, administrative and other charges are a key aspect of 
pension systems, but they are often ignored. Returns are nearly 
always given gross of costs, so that a gross return of 4.5 percent 
becomes a net 3.0 percent after costs. Over time this can have a 
dramatic effect on accumulating lump sums.
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Perhaps the most important data issue is that projections, often for 
a 40-year period, are treated as facts. One prominent example is that the 
proportion of those aged 65 and over has been projected to increase, but 
the age structure of the population and crucially the size of the labor 
force is uncertain. The only certainty is that past demographic projec-
tions for Ireland have been wrong. A second example is that fi nancial 
market returns are assumed to be constant. The dot com bubble and the 
recent crash were not forecast—they were assumed to be impossible. 
This issue is compounded by the false belief that equities will always 
outperform any other form of investment—that is, there is a positive 
equity risk premium (Stewart 2011, Table 3). The projected illustrated 
returns on the proposed auto-enrollment arrangement in the National 
Pensions Framework document are 7 percent per year real return over 
a 40-year period (Department of Social and Family Affairs 2010, Table 
4.1). This is an important assumption and is crucial to the proposed new 
pension plan. In contrast, the average return on group-managed pension 
funds for the 10-year period to April 2010 was 0.5 percent. The lat-
est group-managed pension fund returns are an improvement compared 
with previous years.
Proposals for an ideal pension system should show how it will solve 
the problems of the existing system in relation to simplicity, adequacy, 
cost, equity, coverage, and effectiveness in delivering pensions. We will 
show how Ireland’s current pension system fails to meet many of these 
criteria and how an ideal system would enable all of them to be met. 
THE CONTEXT FOR REFORM
Ireland has a population of about 4 million (see Table 4.1). Home 
ownership rates are high, with 80 percent of all households and 90 per-
cent of pensioner households owning their own homes. Life expectancy 
for men and women at age 65 is 15.4 years and 18.7 years, respectively. 
Although Ireland is committed to maintaining living standards in 
old age, the balance, in terms of policy, between public and private pro-
vision is struck in favor of private provision. Successive governments 
have taken the view that the role of the public social security pension
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Table 4.1  Key Economic and Demographic Data for Ireland, 2006 
 Category
Population (million) 4.2 
GDP current prices and current PPPsa, (US$, billion) 175.1
GDP per capita, current prices and PPPs (US$) 41,300
Home ownership rates: all households (%) 80
Home ownership rates: households aged 65+ (%) 90
Life expectancy in 2001 at age 65: male (years) 15.4
                                                        female (years) 18.7
a Purchasing power parity.
SOURCE: GDP and GDP per capita: OECD in Figures; home ownership: Department 
of Social and Family Affairs (2007b, p. 26); life expectancy: Irish Life Table No. 14, 
2001–2003. 
system is to provide a minimum basic income that will prevent poverty 
in retirement. As the state social security pension is not suffi cient for 
most people to maintain their living standard in retirement, the private 
sector pensions market is given generous tax relief on contributions 
and investment income to encourage individuals to make their own ar-
rangements to top up the fl at-rate state pension with an earnings-related 
supplement from a private pension provider. 
The Pension System in Ireland 
The structure of the pension system in Ireland refl ects successive 
governments’ conceptions about the role of the state. Table 4.2 shows 
that the structure of the Irish pension system is relatively simple. It is 
based on a partnership approach between government, employers, and 
employees. It consists of a compulsory state social insurance system 
(social security), which levies contributions at a range of proportional 
rates for different classes of contributors and pays fl at-rate benefi ts, and 
a voluntary private system, which is subsidized through the tax system. 
The social insurance system provides a state pension (transition) at age 
65 that requires withdrawal from the labor force for one year and a 
state pension (contributory) at age 66 that does not require withdrawal 
from the labor force. In addition, a means-tested state pension (non-
contributory) is provided for those not covered by the social security 
system. The amounts paid by the transition and contributory pensions
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T able 4.2  Structure of Ireland’s Pension System
Fi rst tier: Mandatory public pension
system—fl at-rate social welfare pensions 
Social insurance (employees) Social assistance (not in workforce or 
not qualifying for social insurance)
Age 65: state pension (transition)
Age 66: state pension (contributory) Age 66: state pension (non-
contributory)
Second tier: Voluntary private pension
system—occupational and personal pensions
Occupational (employees) Personal (self-employed and 
employees)
Defi ned benefi t Retirement Annuity Contract (RAC)
Defi ned contribution Personal Retirement Savings Account 
(PRSA)
SOURCE: Department of Social and Family Affairs, http://www.dsfa.ie.
are the same, while the non-contributory pension has usually been about 
10 percent less than the social security pension, although the difference 
is currently just 5 percent. For convenience, these three pensions will 
be referred to as the social welfare pension where it is not necessary to 
distinguish among them.
An important feature of the Irish pension system is that the state so-
cial security pension is integrated with occupational pension payments 
for most defi ned benefi t plans, so that both payments combined can-
not exceed an agreed replacement rate. This means that an increase in 
state social security pensions may reduce payments from occupational 
pension plans. For this reason, employers with defi ned benefi t plans 
welcome increases in social welfare payments.
The private pension system has two components: occupational pen-
sion plans and personal pension plans. Occupational plans are provided 
on a voluntary basis by employers for groups of employees. Personal 
pension plans are for employees who are not covered by an occupa-
tional plan or individuals who are not employed. Personal plans take 
the form of Retirement Annuity Contracts (RAC) for the self-employed 
and Personal Retirement Savings Accounts (PRSA) for everyone else. 
In the past, most of the workplace plans were defi ned benefi t pen-
sions. Consequently, they were supposed to provide a guaranteed 
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benefi t that would replace up to two-thirds of preretirement earnings 
for employees who spent their full career with one employer. In the last 
10 years or so, many defi ned benefi t pension plans have been closed to 
new entrants. They have been replaced by defi ned contribution plans 
because most employers are no longer willing to guarantee new en-
trants to the labor force a pension related to length of service and level 
of fi nal earnings. The benefi ts that a member of an occupational or in-
dividual defi ned contribution plan can expect will depend on how much 
is contributed to the plan, how well the plan is managed, and the perfor-
mance of stocks, shares, and other assets. All of the investment risk in 
defi ned contribution plans is borne by employees or the self-employed 
rather than by employers. 
Although the structure of the pension system is relatively simple, 
operating it has become complex because of the variety of categories 
of workers contributing to the public social security system and the 
large buildup of pension and tax law required to regulate private pen-
sion funds and the drawdown of pension benefi ts.
Pensioner Poverty Rates and the Level of State Social
Security Pensions 
Considerable progress has been made in recent years in reducing 
poverty among pensioners by increasing the social welfare pension, 
where poverty is defi ned as a retirement income of below 60 percent of 
average earnings. Figure 4.1 shows that the percentage of pensioners at 
risk of poverty increased from 20 percent in 1997 to over 36 percent in 
2003, primarily due to the failure of the social welfare pension to keep 
pace with increases in average industrial earnings during a period of 
rapid earnings growth. Since then, however, the social welfare pension 
has increased faster than workers’ earnings and the rate fell to just over 
11 percent in 2008.2
The increases in the social welfare pension in 2004 and subsequent 
years have signifi cantly improved Ireland’s ranking in international 
comparisons of pensioner poverty. Using a comparable measure of 
relative income poverty for all EU27 countries, Figure 4.2 shows that 
Ireland’s pensioner poverty rate of 21 percent in 2008 was a little over 
the average EU27 rate of 19 percent.3 Nevertheless, the fact that one-
fi fth of pensioners were at risk of poverty in 2008 indicates that there 
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SOURCE:  Whelan et al. (2003) and Central Statistics Offi ce (2009).
is some way to go to eliminate pensioner poverty in Ireland. The very 
low pensioner poverty rate for New Zealand, which has a fl at-rate state 
social security pension similar to the social welfare pension in Ireland, 
indicates what could be achieved if Ireland were prepared to increase 
the level of the social welfare pension above the poverty level. 
Some progress has been made toward this objective. Figure 4.3 
shows that the level of the social security and social assistance pensions 
for couples relative to average industrial earnings changed little be-
tween 1994 and 2000. In 2001, the government began to respond to the 
large increase in pensioner poverty that had occurred when the economy
was booming during the 1997–2000 period by starting to increase pen-
sions faster than earnings. This policy resulted in the gap between social 
security and social assistance pensions and the 60 percent poverty line 
for a couple narrowing from about 6 and 10 percentage points, respec-
tively, in 2003 to 4 and 7 percentage points in 2008.
These improvements have, therefore, brought the social security 
and social assistance pensions to within striking distance of the poverty 
line of 60 percent of average earnings. It would be perfectly feasible for 
the Irish government to increase the social welfare pension to a level 
Figure 4.1  Percentage of People Age 65 and Over in Ireland at  Risk of     
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SOURCE: Zaidi (2010) and Ministry of Social Development (2005).
that would virtually eliminate pensioner poverty, as has been done in 
New Zealand with a similar fl at-rate state pension. Callan, Nolan, and 
Walsh (2007) have shown that an increase in the social welfare pension 
to bring it above the poverty level would require only 837 ($1,071) 
million euros (€) of the €1,462 ($1,871) million increase in revenue the 
Exchequer (government treasury department) could raise by giving tax 
relief on private pension contributions at the standard rate of tax rather 
than at the marginal rate of tax.4 
On its own, increasing the social welfare pension would not resolve 
the complications resulting from incomplete contribution records for 
the social security pension, the means test for the social assistance pen-
sion, rules about dependency, the retirement condition required for the 
social security state pension (transition), and the interaction of the social 
welfare pension with private pensions, which creates uncertainty about 
Figure 4.2 Percentage of People Age 65 and Over at Risk of Poverty 
Relative to the 60 Percent Poverty Line for People Age 65 and 
Over in the EU27 in 2008 and New Zealand in 2009
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how much to save and results in the loss of private pension benefi ts for 
low-paid members of some occupational defi ned benefi t pension plans. 
Women in Ireland are particularly disadvantaged by the social se-
curity and private pension systems because women provide most of the 
care required by children and elderly relatives. Consequently, their work 
histories are more irregular than those of men, and it is more diffi cult 
for women to qualify for either a social welfare or a private pension. 
As the purpose of Ireland’s fl at-rate social welfare pension is to prevent 
poverty in old age, these problems could ideally be addressed by intro-
ducing a universal state social security pension to eliminate the means 
test and differential payments to pensioners whose needs are the same. 
The introduction of a universal pension would require an increase 
in public expenditure. This is the primary reason why a universal state 
social security pension was ruled out in the Green Paper on Pensions 
(Department of Social and Family Affairs 2007a). However, as already 
noted, there is some scope for increasing current expenditure on pen-
sions because Ireland has operated a very favorable tax regime for 
Figure 4.3 Social Insurance, Social Assistance Pension, and the 60 
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pensions to encourage the development of the private pension system. 
Figure 4.4 indicates that the cost of tax relief was initially fairly mod-
est, but it has grown rapidly over the last three decades. As argued later, 
reducing tax relief would enable the payment of higher social welfare 
pensions.
In 1980, the earliest year for which the Revenue Commissioners esti-
mated the cost of the tax relief for occupational pensions, it amounted 
to about €51 ($64) million. By 1990, its cost had increased more than 
fi ve times to €283 ($362) million. In the year 2000, just before the dot 
com bubble burst, the Exchequer was forgoing about the same amount 





























Figure 4.4 Actual Expenditures on Social Welfare Pensions and Tax  
Expenditures on Pensions, 1980–2007
NOTE: There is a break in the tax expenditure series in 2004 and 2005, and the fi gures 
for 2006 and 2007 are not comparable with those for previous years because of a 
change in the method of estimation.
SOURCE: Social welfare pensions: Hughes (1985, Table A4) and Statistical Reports 
of the Department of Social and Family Affairs. Pensions tax expenditure: Statistical 
Reports of the Revenue Commissioners. 
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security pensions, €1.6 ($2.05) billion, for those aged 65 and over. In 
the Finance Act of 2004, steps were taken to improve the quality of data 
on pension contributions by requiring employers to provide details in 
their annual P35 tax return form of aggregate employer and employee 
contributions to pension plans. When the results of the new method of 
estimation were published in the Green Paper on Pensions (Department 
of Social and Family Affairs 2007a), they showed that the cost of tax 
relief for private pensions was signifi cantly higher than had been shown 
by previous estimates. In 2006, the cost of the tax relief amounted to 
€2.9 ($3.7) billion—almost the same as the amount the Exchequer 
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0.0
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Figure 4.5 Exchequer Expenditures on Social Welfare Pensions, Pension 
Tax Relief, and the Aggregate for Both, 1980–2007 (as a 
percentage of GNP)
NOTE: There is a break in the tax expenditure series in 2004 and 2005, and the fi gures 
for 2006 and 2007 are not comparable with those for previous years because of a 
change in the method of estimation.
SOURCE: Annual Statistical Reports of the Department of Social and Family Affairs 
and the Revenue Commissioners.
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the cost of the tax relief fell to €2.6 ($3.3) billion as a consequence of 
the fi nancial crisis, while the cost of state social security pensions in-
creased to €3.9 ($5.0) billion.
If the cost of tax forgone on private pensions is taken into account, 
we get a different perspective on pension costs. Figure 4.5 shows the 
cost of public expenditure and tax expenditure on pensions in Ireland 
relative to GNP over the period 1980–2007. At the beginning of the pe-
riod in 1980, the cost of the state social security pension was 3.3 percent 
of GNP, while the cost of the pension tax expenditure was 0.4 percent 
of GNP. The cost of the social security pension increased to 4 percent of 
GNP up to 1985, while the cost of the pension tax expenditure remained 
around one-tenth of that at 0.4 percent of GNP. From 1985 to 2003, the 
cost of the social security pension fell continuously to about 2 percent 
of GNP while the cost of the pension tax expenditure more than tripled 
to 1.4 percent of GNP as the government pursued its policy of develop-
ing the private pension system. Between 2000 and 2001, the cost of the 
pension tax expenditure fell as a result of the collapse of the dot com 
bubble. However, it recovered quickly and it rose to 1.9 percent of GNP 
in 2006 before falling back to 1.6 percent in 2007 as a consequence of 
the fi nancial crisis. 
Adding the cost of the tax relief for private pensions in Ireland to 
the cost of public social security expenditure on pensions provides a 
different perspective on the issue of the affordability of a universal state 
pension in Ireland. The addition of the tax expenditure on the private 
pension system in Ireland indicates that the resource cost of supporting 
the public social security and private pension systems has fl uctuated 
around 4 percent between 1980 and 2007. There is scope, therefore, for 
reallocating resources between the public and private components of 
the pension system.
PROBLEMS WITH THE PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEM
The way in which pension tax relief is allocated to members of oc-
cupational and individual pension plans is inequitable. Figure 4.6 shows 
the distribution by income quintile of the tax relief on self-employed in 
1999–2000 and employee contributions to occupational pension funds 
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in the year 2000. The distribution for both employment groups is much 
the same—the bulk of the tax relief accrues to the top 20 percent of 
earners (quintile 5 in Figure 4.6), while the bottom 20 percent receive 
virtually nothing. Two-thirds of the tax relief for employees and three-
quarters of the relief for the self-employed accrued to people in the 
highest income quintile. The bottom 20 percent of employees and the 
self-employed received only 1.1 percent and 0.2 percent, respectively, 
of the tax relief. The distribution of the tax relief for the self-employed 
is more concentrated than it is for employees because the pension cov-
erage rate for the self-employed is signifi cantly lower than it is for 
employees.
The distribution of tax relief is concentrated at the top end of the 
earnings distribution because the effective limits on employee contri-
butions in Ireland were largely determined by the maximum pension 
permitted under Revenue Commissioners rules that would attract tax 
relief, rather than by a maximum contribution. In Ireland, the pension 















Bottom Second Third Fourth Fifth
Income quintile
Figure 4.6  Distribution by Income Quintile of Tax Relief on Pension 
Contributions by Employees in 2000 and Self-Employed 
Workers in 1999–2000
SOURCE: Hughes (2007, Figure 3.12).
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Figure 4.7  Occupational Pension Coverage Rates, 1985–2009 (%)
upper bound on how much could be contributed, although it varied with 
age and level of earnings. 
Pension tax relief in Ireland is intended to increase the coverage 
of the private pension system and to provide an earnings-related sup-
plement to the social welfare pension. Hence, one would expect the 
coverage of occupational pension plans to have risen over the last 20 
years and the social welfare pension to be less important than private 
pensions in delivering an income in retirement. Let us consider, there-
fore, what has happened to private pension coverage and how effective 
public and private provision are in delivering retirement income to the 
older population. 
Trends in the Coverage of Occupational Pensions
Figure 4.7 shows that the occupational pension coverage rate de-
clined by 8 percentage points from 1985 to 1999. From 2000 to 2009, 
however, much of the ground lost was recovered so that the coverage 












SOURCE: Hughes (2007, Figure 3.13) and authors’ estimates. 
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Figure 4.8 Percentage of Workers Covered by Defi ned Benefi t (DB) and 
Defi ned Contribution (DC) Occupational Pension Schemes, 
1985–2006
SOURCE: Pensions Board Annual Reports.
Figure 4.7. A factor that may have contributed to this recovery was the 
very strong employment growth experienced between 1995 and 2006 
when Ireland’s economy grew at rates that were unprecedented since 
Independence in 1921. 
It is evident, therefore, that the policy of providing generous tax re-
lief to encourage the growth of occupational pension plans has not been 
effective in increasing pension coverage over the last 25 years. This 
failure has been compounded by a switch in coverage from occupa-
tional defi ned benefi t plans to defi ned contribution plans, as Figure 4.8 
shows. The switch to defi ned contribution plans places a big obstacle 
in the path to the achievement of the Pensions Board target of replacing 
50 percent of preretirement income because the difference between the 
target for the social insurance pension (34 percent of average earnings) 
and the overall target has to be made up by a private pension.5 The deci-
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plans for most new entrants to the labor force means that there can be 
no certainty about what average level of pension the private sector can 
deliver. 
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the average level of pension 
that can now be delivered by the private pension system, Ireland has 
put a lot of effort during the last 10 years into the development of 
a personal pension option in the hope that it would help to increase 
the pension coverage rate. The government’s advisory body on pen-
sions, the Pensions Board, identifi ed a number of barriers to improving 
pension coverage (see Pensions Board 1998). It recommended that a 
standardized, low-cost personal retirement savings option should be 
made widely available irrespective of employment status. 
The government accepted the Board’s recommendation, and it in-
troduced the PRSA in 2003 for employees and others not covered by 
an occupational plan or an RAC. The government made it mandatory 
for employers to designate a PRSA provider, but it did not require the 
employer to make a contribution on behalf of employees. Age-related 
tax incentives were provided to encourage people to start saving for 
retirement. Anyone under the age of 30 taking out a PRSA is allowed 
to claim tax relief on contributions of up to 15 percent of earnings. The 
percentage of earnings on which tax relief can be claimed increases 
with age until it reaches 40 percent for those aged 60 and over. 
PRSAs operate like defi ned contribution pension plans, but their 
charges are considerably higher than those for occupational plans as 
they do not benefi t from the economies of scale accruing to group plans. 
It was hoped that tax relief, and the mandatory requirement for employ-
ers to provide access to a PRSA, would result in a signifi cant increase 
in pension coverage within fi ve years of the introduction of the PRSA. 
This expectation has not been met. Seven years after the introduction of 
PRSAs, coverage had increased by only 2 percentage points, from 52 
percent in the fi rst quarter of 2002 to 54 percent in fi rst quarter of 2008. 
The failure of a voluntary approach to increasing pension cover-
age has resulted in the publication of a National Pensions Framework 
(Department of Social and Family Affairs 2010) in which the govern-
ment proposes to increase coverage by introducing an auto-enrollment 
plan for employees who are not covered by their employer’s plan. Very 
few details are provided about how this plan will work. It is worth not-
ing that the option of a quasi-mandatory addition to the Irish pension 
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system was considered in the Green Paper on Pensions and a decision 
was deferred because “It would be useful, perhaps, to allow time for 
more evidence on performance of soft mandatory schemes elsewhere 
to emerge, particularly from New Zealand” (Department of Social and 
Family Affairs 2007a, par. 8.54). To date, the government has not pro-
duced any evaluation of how the auto-enrollment plan has worked in 
New Zealand, but St John, Littlewood, and Dale (2010) have shown 
that the New Zealand plan has required signifi cant subsidies from the 
government to achieve the large number of enrollments that have oc-
curred to date.
EFFECTIVENESS OF PENSION DELIVERY
A key issue in designing an ideal pension system is determining 
how effective the public and private components are in delivering pen-
sions. One way to look at this issue is in terms of what proportion of the 
target population actually receives income from each component.
Despite all the tax relief, the long-term existence of occupational 
pensions, and various government initiatives, state welfare pensions and 
other transfer payments provide the bulk of income to retired persons. 
These and other points can be deduced from Household Budget survey 
data for the 2004–2005 period. The data consist of a randomly cho-
sen cross-section survey of 6,884 households. Because the raw data are 
based on households,6 they were converted into a per capita equivalent 
basis using standard adjustment techniques. Table 4.3 shows the num-
bers of those aged 65 and over reporting income from various sources. 
Not all of those aged 65 and over report pension income, but the num-
ber of people reporting occupational pension income is less than half 
of those included in the survey. Over 70 percent of respondents report 
income from the state social security pension; slightly over 50 percent 
report fi nancial income and just under 30 percent report earned income. 
Table 4.4 shows income per capita broken down by various sources. 
The main features of Table 4.4 are as follows:
• Mean and median gross income decline with age, except for 
income from state welfare pensions.
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• Income from various state welfare pensions accounts for 38 
percent of total income for those aged 65–74 and 53 percent of 
income for those aged over 75. 
• Mean income from occupational pension coverage is low, and 
median values are zero, indicating that most of those included 
in the survey do not receive an occupational pension.
• Financial sources of income are low and highly skewed; the 
median values are zero.
• Non-pension income accounts for 28 percent of mean income 
for those aged 65–74 and 13 percent of those aged 75+. This 
represents a signifi cant reliance of retired persons on sources 
of retirement income other than pension income, mostly repre-
senting paid work.
The small number of those with occupational pensions is surprising, 
but it is of interest to examine incomes for those reporting occupational 
pension income. Table 4.5 shows income data for those with pensions 
from state employment. Even for those with occupational pensions 
from state employment, state social welfare payments are important, 
accounting for 30 percent of mean pension income for those aged 75+, 
or 38 percent of median pension income. Mean income from fi nancial 
assets is higher than for the entire survey group but still low. Non-
pension income is lower than for retired persons as a group in the sur-
vey, at 18 percent of mean income.
Table 4.5 also shows the same data for those who report pension 
income from non-state employment. The gross income and pension 
income are lower for all age groups compared with those who report 
pension income from state employment. For example, for those 75 and 
older, median pension income is almost 30 percent lower than those re-
porting pension income from state employment. The gap is even larger 
for those aged 65–74 (35 percent). However, gross incomes are closer, 
at about 81 percent of the level of those with a pension from state em-
ployment because fi nancial income and income from paid work are 
higher. 
Table 4.5 also shows an inequality in pension income (and gross 
income) between those groups reporting pension income from state 
employment as compared with those reporting pension income from 























Earned and other 
income
65–74   871    831      138      257     630   475 314
75+   573    557        81      136     440   251 107
Total 1,444  1,388      219      393   1,070   726 421
NOTE: The cells do not sum to the number of respondents in the survey because some people reported income from multiple sources.
a State old-age pension, state retirement pension, widows’ pensions, and blind person’s pension.


























Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med.
65–74   871 339    242 221     185 43.2      0 48.4      0 129      166 10.5   0.4 83.7   0
75+   573 276    203 219     187 35.1      0 37.8      0 146      176  9.6      0.0 27.3   0
Total 1,444 314    216 220     187 40.0      0 44.2      0 136      173 11.0     0.1 61.3   0
Table 4.4  Sources of Pension Income (€ per week)
NOTE: Not all income is shown by source. Hence the individual rows do not sum to total gross mean income.
























Total earned  
income
Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med.
State employment pension
65–74 138 465       413 377     370 273       238 12      0 92     101 14      6 61        0
75+ 81 444       387 378     356 248      214 15      0 115     135 19      2 28        0
Total 219 457       403 377     359 264       230 13      0 100     105 16      4 49        0
Non-state employment pension
65–74 257 424      334 295       242 16     0 164      0 115     132 19      2 91        0
75+ 136 355      293 289       252 15     0 159      0 114     138 14      0 25        0
Total 393 400      326 293       244 16     0 162      0 115     132 17      1 68        0
No occupational pension
65–74 498 267     193 145       174 0      0 0      0 145     174 4       0 88         0
75+ 367 218     193 163       180 0      0 0      0 163     180 5       0 29         0
Total 865 246     193 153      175 0       0 0      0 153     175 4       0 63         0
Table 4.5  Income for Those Reporting Pension Income from State Employment Pensions, Non-State Employment 
Pensions, and No Occupational Pensions (€ per week)
NOTE: Not all income is shown by source. Hence the individual rows do not sum to total gross mean income.
a State old-age pension, state retirement pension, widows’ pensions, and blind person’s pension.
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average income varies between 73 and 87 percent for those reporting 
pension income from non-state employment, compared with 94 to 98 
percent for those reporting income from state employment. 
Gross income and pension incomes of those with pension income 
from non-state employment, while lower than those with pension in-
come from state employment, is still higher than the average pension 
income of all retired persons in the survey. The reason for this is the 
much lower pension income of those with no occupational pension in-
come, as shown in Table 4.5. The gap between median pension income 
and median gross income is not large, but the gap between mean gross 
income and mean pension income is the largest in percentage terms of 
the separate groups examined. This refl ects the relatively higher contri-
bution to income from paid work for this group
Apart from considerable differences in pension income between 
those who report occupational pension income as compared with those 
who do not, there are also large differences in pension income by gender. 
Table 4.6 shows the gender of those reporting no occupational incomes 
for single-person households only. People without an occupational pen-
sion are predominantly female. There are nearly twice as many single 
females as males living alone without any occupational pension. 
Although not shown in the table, their incomes are one-third to one-half 
of those with occupational pensions. Females also make up the majority 
(60 percent) of those living alone with an occupational pension.
Table 4.7 shows occupational pension income broken down by 
state employment pension, non-state employment pension, and gender 
for single-person households (hence the numbers of respondents are 
smaller). Median pension income is highest for females with a state oc-








65–75 235   87  148    125  54  71
75+ 222   69  153      98  38  60
Total 457 156  301    223  92 131
Table 4.6  Gender of People with and without Occupational Pensions for 
Single-Person Households
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State pension income Non-state pension income
Age
Male Female Male Female
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median
65–74 19 272          217 31 304    333 35 219     140 40 168 154
75+ 11 375          214 22 230    239 29 182     144 39 151 120
Total 30 310          215 53 274    268 64 202     142 79 159 125
Table 4.7  Occupational Pension Income (€ per week) by Gender
NOTE: Not all income is shown by source. Hence the individual rows do not sum to total gross mean income.
a State old-age pension, state retirement pension, widows’ pensions, and blind person’s pension.
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income—the mean and median values are much closer in all cases. For 
those reporting non-state occupational pension income, the median in-
come is higher for males aged 75+ but not for those aged 65–74.
Finally, the minor role that the private pension system and other 
sources of income play in providing retirement incomes in Ireland be-
comes even more evident when the data are disaggregated by income 
quintile to show how much income pensioners in different quintiles re-
ceive from each income source (Figure 4.9). State pensions account for 
almost all of the income received by pensioners in the fi rst four quin-
tiles. Private pensions and other income provide a signifi cant part of 
total income only to the group at the top of the income distribution. 
Private pensions, investments, and earnings provide around three-
quarters of the total income of pensioners with the highest incomes. 
This is hardly surprising given the skewed distribution of pension tax 
relief in favor of the highest earners. 
Figure 4.9 Value of All Pension Unit Incomes by Source and Income 
Quintile
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THE FAILURES AND SUCCESSES OF IRELAND’S
PENSION SYSTEM
Our evaluation of the pension system in Ireland in terms of sim-
plicity, adequacy, cost, equity, coverage, and effectiveness in delivering 
pensions leads to a number of conclusions. The main defect of the Irish 
public pension system is that it has failed to eliminate pensioner poverty. 
Successive governments’ preferences for a public system that provides 
only a subsistence income in retirement and for a private system that is 
supposed to provide an earnings-related top-up has focused attention on 
the cost of the public social security system while the cost of Exchequer 
support for private pensions has been largely ignored. The cost of the 
tax expenditure for private pensions in Ireland is now nearly as great 
as the cost of direct expenditure on the public social security system. 
Consequently, when the cost of the tax expenditure is factored in, the 
aggregate cost of pension provision has fl uctuated around 4 percent of 
GNP for the last 30 years.
Contrary to expectations, the provision of generous tax relief for 
private pensions has not increased the coverage of occupational pen-
sions. Most of the benefi ts of the tax relief for private pensions have 
been appropriated by the very highest earners. This occurs at the ex-
pense of taxpayers, most of whom generally receive little benefi t from 
the favorable tax treatment of private pensions. 
PROPOSED REFORMS: NATIONAL 
PENSIONS FRAMEWORK
The recently published National Pensions Framework (Department 
of Social and Family Affairs 2010) sets out the government strategy on 
pensions. It states that the government “will seek to sustain” the state 
social security pension at 35 percent of average weekly earnings. It is 
currently at 32 percent. It will also become easier for some groups to 
qualify. There will be tax reform, but rather than granting all relief at the 
standard 20 percent rate, relief will be granted at a 33 percent rate, and 
rather than eliminating the tax exemption from lump sum payments, the 
102   Hughes and Stewart
maximum tax-free lump sum will be reduced to €200,000 ($256,000), 
which exempts from tax the lump sum payable to the most senior civil 
servants.
The National Pensions Framework proposes an individual pension 
plan in addition to those already in existence (Additional Voluntary 
Contribution, PRSA, Approved Retirement Fund, and others) but only 
for those without pension coverage (Department of Social and Family 
Affairs 2010, pp. 29–31). This proposed plan has all the signs of an ini-
tiative led by the pension industry. There will be auto-enrollment (with 
an opt-out option), funds will be invested, and as noted above there is 
the typical industry analysis of returns assuming a constant 7 percent 
per year, in real terms, for 40 years (Department of Social and Family 
Affairs 2010, Table 4.1, p. 32). 
It is most unlikely that this plan will succeed in providing adequate 
retirement income. The contribution periods of workers will be less than 
forecast, given periods of unemployment, working abroad, or caring for 
children and other family members. Financial market returns will cer-
tainly not be as forecast. In addition, the proposed contribution level as 
a proportion of salary is too low (8 percent) to provide retirement in-
come as forecast in government proposals. In addition, the proposals do 
not attempt to quantify the extra risk borne by members of the new plan. 
There is a danger that employers will see this new plan as a cheaper
alternative to existing plans because they may contribute 2 percent 
of salary to the new plan, whereas contributions to existing defi ned 
contribution plans have been reported to be 11 percent of salary and 
contributions to defi ned benefi t plans are 16 percent of salary. More 
recently a fi gure of 6 percent has been cited as the average contribution 
rate to defi ned contribution plans. Thus employers may seek to switch 
employees from an existing defi ned benefi t, or more likely defi ned con-
tribution plan, to the new cheaper plan. A similar trend has occurred in 
the United States with 401(k) plans.
The cost of the new plan (managing funds, a tracking mechanism 
to keep track of mobile workers, and managing dormant accounts) will 
be expensive, as has been shown to be true in Australia. For small ac-
counts, fees over time could reduce sums considerably.
Government proposals also involve reform of pensions in relation 
to state employment. The main proposed reforms for new entrants in-
volve increasing the retirement age to 66 and basing pensions on career 
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average earnings. The main proposal in relation to existing and future 
public service employees is that the consumer price index rather than fi -
nal salary will be used as the basis for post-retirement pension increases.
The new government proposals have nothing to say about the Na-
tional Pension Reserve Fund. Perhaps this is because the reserve fund is 
now essentially a vehicle to provide fi nance to the Irish banking system. 
Originally it was intended to partially prefund future state employee 
and social welfare pensions and was hailed by some commentators as 
the most important initiative in a decade. 
The government-proposed reforms have little to offer to members 
of defi ned benefi t plans in actuarial defi cit. A particular concern for 
many employees is that their employer may be unprofi table or insolvent 
as a result of property speculation, over-borrowing, and extraordinarily 
poor management. 
The government proposals, however, devote some space to ad-
vocating programs of fi nancial education for individuals relating to 
retirement planning and summarizing the considerable state effort at 
fi nancial education for individuals. However, fi nancial education is not 
the key to successful retirement planning or fi nancial decision making, 
as Ghillarducci (2008, p. 137) notes. 
Finally, there is a proposal that the earliest age at which the state 
social security pension can be received will increase to 68 starting in 
2014. There is no discussion of enhanced benefi ts as a result. Increas-
ing the retirement age may be welcome by some groups with particular 
skills, for example, professional groups such as lawyers. But for those 
working in hazardous or physically demanding employment, increasing 
the retirement age could substantially reduce the period of retirement. It 
is therefore regressive, representing a transfer from those who are less 
well off and with lower life expectancies to those who are better off and 
with higher life expectancies.
These proposed reforms do not address the issues of equity and ef-
fi ciency. The ultimate viability of any pension system depends on the 
future productivity of an economy. Unless issues of equity and effi -
ciency are addressed, future productivity will be adversely affected. 
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THE KEY TO DEVELOPING AN IDEAL PENSION SYSTEM 
FOR IRELAND
Despite the poor performance of private pensions, the National 
Pensions Framework proposals for the future development of the pen-
sion system aim to maintain the social welfare pension at a subsistence 
level of about one-third of average earnings and to try to increase the 
coverage of the private pension system. It is hoped this can be done 
by automatically enrolling employees who are not covered by an oc-
cupational plan in individual pension accounts that would be managed 
by the private sector. This proposal fl ies in the face of the evidence that 
the social security public pension system is far more effective than the 
private system in delivering pensions and in providing the bulk of re-
tirement income. Only a small minority of pensioners at the top of the 
income distribution receive signifi cant benefi ts from the private pen-
sion system. 
The evidence on the performance of the two components of Ire-
land’s pension system strongly suggests that the opposite should be 
done in an ideal system. There should be a larger role for the public 
component rather than for the private component of the pension system. 
The current system could be developed in ways that draw on the 
strengths of the public component and begin to correct the inequita-
ble treatment of taxpayers who gain little from tax relief for private 
pensions. Ireland is not, of course, starting with a clean slate. Pension 
systems are to some extent path dependent, so it is not being suggested 
that Ireland should ignore what has been done in the past. What would 
be possible is to change the balance of pension provision in favor of the 
social security public system.
Elements of an Ideal Pension System for Ireland
The evidence presented above shows that the public component of 
the pension system is doing a far better job of delivering an income 
in retirement than the private component, that it is currently providing 
retirement income for over 90 percent of pensioners, and that its ben-
efi ts are not high enough to prevent poverty in old age. To build on the 
strengths of the social security public pension system and to address 
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its weaknesses, the TCD Pension Policy Research Group (see Hughes 
2007; McCashin 2005; Stewart 2005) proposed that the tax incentives 
for private pensions should be at the standard rate of tax rather than the 
marginal rate; the fl at-rate social welfare pension should be increased 
to 40 percent of earnings to bring it above the poverty level; it should 
become a universal benefi t, similar to New Zealand’s superannuation, 
which would be payable to every pensioner on the basis of residence 
in the country for a specifi c period of years; and a second-tier social 
security pension should be introduced to top up the universal pension to 
50 percent of earnings.
A universal social security pension funded out of general taxation 
would be distinctively redistributive, it would ensure pensions as of right 
for men and women, and it would abolish the means test for pensions. 
The transformation of the current social security system into a second-
tier earnings-related pension recognizes the strong social and political 
attachment to work-based pensions in Ireland. The social security 
pension would not require dependents’ additions because dependents 
would be entitled to a pension in their own right under the proposal for 
a universal state social security pension. This would strengthen the role 
of social security as a benefi t derived from participation in the labor 
force. The pension could be fl at rate, as it is now, or it could be related 
to earnings. This design “recognises the fact that a pensions system, of 
necessity, must incorporate a number of competing values, that reform 
must build to some extent on existing provisions and expectations, and 
command broad public support” (McCashin 2005, p. 117).
At present, Ireland is using social security pensions to try to achieve 
a number of different objectives: the prevention of poverty in old age; 
the provision of support for pensioners’ dependents; the maintenance of 
contribution records during periods of unemployment, illness, or tem-
porary withdrawal from the labor force; and the provision of adequate 
income during retirement. It is diffi cult to achieve this multiplicity of 
objectives with just one instrument. The introduction of a universal 
state social security pension and a state earnings-related pension would 
separate the goal of poverty prevention from that of income mainte-
nance and permit the development of policies that would have a better 
chance of achieving each objective. 
The increase in the state basic social security pension would be 
paid for by giving tax relief for private pensions at the standard rate of 
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tax. The earnings-related component would be paid for by increasing 
employer and employee Pay Related Social Insurance Contributions 
(PRSI) and using some of the revenue released by standard rating the 
tax relief of private pensions. This approach would enable Ireland to 
eliminate pensioner poverty at a cost it could afford and at the same 
time contribute to the long-term sustainability of the public social se-
curity pension system. This approach also has the very considerable 
advantage that it is the only one that would improve the position of 
existing pensioners. Policies that rely on the private pension system 
to improve pensions will do nothing for existing pensioners because a 
long period of time is required for assets to build up to a level that could 
provide even a modest improvement in living standards. 
Is the Ideal Pension System for Ireland Affordable?
The proposals for the ideal pension system for Ireland pose a key 
question: are they affordable? Researchers at the Economic and So-












Table 4.8  Distribution of Gains and Losses from Using the Standard Tax 
Rate for Pension Tax Relief and Increasing the Social Welfare 
Pension Above the Poverty Level and Percentage Change in 
Income by Income Decile, 2005
NOTE: The Social Welfare Pension is assumed to increase by €38 per week. 
SOURCE: Callan, Keane, and Walsh (2009, Tables 5.1 and 5.4).
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cial Research Institute (ESRI) in Dublin have used a micro-simulation 
model to estimate the cost of implementing this policy (see Callan, 
Keane, and Walsh 2009). They simulated what would have been the 
cost in 2005 of increasing the social welfare pension by €38 ($48) per 
week, which would have brought it just above the poverty level, and 
fi nancing the increase in the pension by giving tax relief on private pen-
sion contributions at the standard rate of tax rather than the marginal 
rate. The outcome of this exercise is shown in Table 4.8. The effect of 
using the standard rate of tax relief on pension contributions would be 
to release almost €950 ($1,216) million in tax revenue forgone from 
taxpayers in the sixth to the tenth deciles. Just over three-fi fths of this 
sum, or €585 ($749) million, would be required to bring nearly all pen-
sioners above the poverty level (i.e., by increasing all social security 
and social assistance pensions by €38 [$48] per week). The losses for 
taxpayers in the top fi ve income deciles would range from −0.3 per-
cent to −3.1 percent of income, while the gains for those in the bottom 
half of the income distribution would range from 0.5 percent to 10 per-
cent of income. The biggest losses would be borne by taxpayers in the 
top two income deciles who would contribute to the Exchequer almost 
80 percent of the additional revenue that would be raised by using the 
standard tax rate for tax relief on pension contributions, a result that is 
hardly surprising in view of the evidence presented previously showing 
that the bulk of pension tax relief accrues to taxpayers at the top of the 
income distribution.
Callan, Keane, and Walsh (2009) also calculated the effect of using 
the standard rate for tax relief and raising the social welfare pension 
on the “at risk of poverty” measure for pensioners. They found that the 
pensioner poverty rate would fall by almost 90 percent, from 25.9 per-
cent of households headed by a pensioner to 2.8 percent.
If the state social security pension were brought up to 40 percent of 
earnings, a 10 percent gap would remain between the fi rst-tier pension 
and the replacement rate target of 50 percent of preretirement income 
set by the Pensions Board for the average worker. The objective of the 
proposal for a second-tier social security pension is to close this gap. 
Estimating how much it would cost to do so would necessitate complex 
simulations requiring access to a long-term projection model that is not 
available to us. However, in its National Pensions Review, the Pensions 
Board (2005) considered a mandatory state social security earnings-
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related system (Alternative 4) that would provide a fl at-rate pension of 
34 percent of average industrial earnings and a supplementary social 
security earnings-related payment that would provide a benefi t close 
to the 50 percent target for a substantial additional number of workers. 
The earnings-related component would provide a benefi t of 1 percent 
of annual pensionable earnings between the minimum income for PRSI 
payment and twice average industrial earnings. Annual earnings would 
be revalued at retirement to take account of infl ation and the benefi t 
would be based on career average earnings. Projected retirement in-
come replacement rates under Alternative 4 range from 68 percent for 
those with half average earnings, to 55 percent for those with average 
earnings, and 47 percent for those with twice average earnings.
The additional contributions required to pay for an earnings-related 
social insurance pension would be equivalent to about 5 percent of la-
bor force earnings. To meet the full cost of the existing fl at-rate social 
welfare pension and the Alternative 4 earnings-related component, the 
contribution rate required for a new entrant to the labor force would be 
26.5 percent of pensionable earnings within the limits described above. 
Although we differ with some of the assumptions underlying this al-
ternative, it is the closest in spirit to our proposal and it gives a broad 
indication of the long-term costs and benefi ts of the proposal. 
If Alternative 4 were operated on a pay-as-you-go basis, rather than 
funded as the Pensions Board prefers, it would result in a substantial 
improvement to the Exchequer fi nances in the fi rst decade of its opera-
tion and no increase in cost through 2056 over the current system of 
fl at-rate state social security pensions and tax relief for private pen-
sions. The Pensions Board (2005, p. 253) describes this outcome as 
“illusory” because it assumes costs would increase after 2056. How-
ever, it is worth noting that even if Alternative 4 were funded, it would 
cost just 1.6 percent of GNP more now than the current system and 0.3 
percent more in 2056. On average in the period up to 2026, it would 
cost 1.3 percent of GNP, or 0.3 percent more than the annual contribu-
tion to the National Pension Reserve Fund. 
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CONCLUSION
The proposal to introduce a universal social security pension and 
to reduce the tax relief for retirement saving is not as dramatic as it 
might seem at fi rst sight (see McCashin 2005). The state social security 
pension system is already providing the bulk of retirement income for 
the great majority of pensioners in Ireland. The tax relief for retirement 
saving has not succeeded in increasing coverage of occupational pen-
sion plans, and the tax incentives for personal pensions (PRSAs) have 
had little effect on coverage, especially at the lower end of the income 
distribution. The cost of expenditure on the public social security pen-
sion system and the tax expenditure on the private pension system in 
Ireland are now almost the same. Consequently, there is scope for a 
reallocation of resources between the public and private components of 
Ireland’s pension system.
An important advantage of the proposed strategy is that it would 
provide a secure framework for people who wish to save to maintain 
a reasonable relationship between their income from work and their 
income in retirement. It would improve the living standards of current 
pensioners, contribute to the elimination of pensioner poverty, im-
prove the equity of the tax system, provide equal treatment for men 
and women, and contribute to the long-term sustainability of Ireland’s 
public pension system. Finally, it would strengthen the public social 
security component of the pension system which is already nationally 
established, politically accountable, and enjoys public credibility and 
legitimacy.
Notes
1. For example, the introduction of 401(k) plans in the United States has been as-
sociated with a collapse in retirement income. See Ghilarducci (2008, pp. 56–57).
2. Although governments in Ireland have never committed themselves to formally 
indexing pensions, they have maintained a close relationship with average indus-
trial earnings since the contributory old-age pension was introduced in 1961. Over 
the period 1961–1998, the average personal rate of the contributory pension was 
about 25 percent of average industrial earnings. Following a recommendation 
in 1998 by the Pensions Board (1998) that the personal contributory pension be 
increased to 34 percent of average industrial earnings, it increased to about 30 per-
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cent of average industrial earnings in the period 1998–2007. In 2007 it reached the 
34 percent target set in the Pensions Board report (see Hughes and Watson 2005).
3. The at risk of poverty rates for Ireland in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 differ because the rate 
in Figure 4.1 is primarily based on a national defi nition that includes income from 
private pensions whereas Figure 4.2 is based on an EU defi nition that excludes 
such income. For further information, see Central Statistics Offi ce (2009). 
4. The exchange rate on June 30, 2006, was €1 = $1.28, and this rate is used through-
out the paper to convert euros into U.S. dollars.
5. The Pensions Board replacement rate targets of 34 percent and 50 percent are 
modest. Munnell and Quinby (2009, p. 3) point out that “as a general benchmark, 
retirement income equal to 65 to 80 percent of pre-retirement earnings should be 
more or less adequate.” 
6. The accuracy of the data depends on the accuracy of information given by inde-
pendent households. For example, the Household Budget Survey notes (Central 
Statistics Offi ce 1997, p. 6) that, “no adjustment is made for the understatement of 
expenditure, for example [on] alcoholic drink which is a traditional national and 
international phenomenon in household expenditure surveys of this type.” In addi-
tion, the Central Statistics Offi ce (2001, p. 5) comments that, “some categories of 
income tend to be underestimated in surveys of this nature.”
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